
The prohibition of marriage between close relatives is one of the most fundamental subjects of religious family law. It concerns not merely whom a person may marry, but the boundaries between parenthood, siblinghood, kinship, and marriage itself.
The Old Testament and the Quran explicitly identify numerous prohibited relationships. The New Testament condemns particular incestuous relationships and reflects an inherited Jewish moral framework. Against this background, the treatment of marriage between relatives in the Bahá’í Faith raises a serious theological question: Why did Bahá’u’lláh, who claimed to bring divine legislation for a new religious dispensation, leave the prohibited degrees of blood relationship unspecified, even when directly asked about them?
This question becomes more consequential when the chronology is considered. Bahá’u’lláh referred the matter to the future House of Justice; the Universal House of Justice was not established until 1963, approximately 90 years after the claimed revelation of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas. In 1981, that institution stated that it had not yet made regulations on marriage with one’s kindred.
The central issue is therefore not whether the Bahá’í Faith values marriage or family life. It is whether a claimed divinely revealed legal system provided sufficiently clear guidance on an elementary, foreseeable moral question.
1. What the earlier Abrahamic scriptures established
The Old Testament
Leviticus 18:6 establishes the governing principle:
“None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I am the LORD.”
The following verses, Leviticus 18:7–18, specify mothers, sisters, granddaughters, aunts, daughters-in-law, and several relationships through marriage. The language concerns prohibited sexual relations and forms a foundation for Jewish laws governing prohibited marriages.
The New Testament
In 1 Corinthians 5:1, Paul condemns a relationship between a man and his father’s wife:
“It is reported commonly that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles, that one should have his father’s wife.”
The New Testament does not reproduce the full Levitical catalogue, but it explicitly condemns this relationship rather than treating it as an unanswered question. Its approach operates within an existing scriptural tradition, considering old testament to be applicable as of today particularly for moral laws and not claiming to abrogate them. See also Mark 6:18 and Matthew 14:3–4.
The Quran
Surah al-Nisa 4:23 identifies prohibited relatives with particular clarity. The following is the complete verse in English translation (Pickthall):
“Forbidden unto you are your mothers, and your daughters, and your sisters, and your father’s sisters, and your mother’s sisters, and your brother’s daughters and your sister’s daughters; and your foster-mothers, and your foster-sisters, and your mothers-in-law, and your step-daughters who are under your protection (born) of your women unto whom ye have gone in—but if ye have not gone in unto them, then it is no sin for you (to marry their daughters)—and the wives of your sons who (spring) from your own loins. And (it is forbidden unto you) that ye should have two sisters together, except what hath already happened (of that nature) in the past. Lo! Allah is ever Forgiving, Merciful.”
Surah al-Nisa 4:22 separately prohibits marrying women previously married to one’s father, while 4:24 addresses further marital restrictions.
The contrast is significant: these scriptures do not leave their followers without explicit foundational prohibitions involving close blood relatives. They distinguish family relationships from marital relationships through identifiable rules.
2. What Bahá’u’lláh actually prescribed
The Kitáb-i-Aqdas, claimed to be revealed around 1873, contains the following complete paragraph (§107):
“It is forbidden you to wed your fathers’ wives. We shrink, for very shame, from treating of the subject of boys. Fear ye the Merciful, O peoples of the world! Commit not that which is forbidden you in Our Holy Tablet, and be not of those who rove distractedly in the wilderness of their desires.”
The paragraph prohibits marriage to one’s father’s wife but does not explicitly enumerate prohibited blood relationships.
(Bahá’í Reference Library)
The issue becomes particularly striking in Questions and Answers, No. 50, recorded during Bahá’u’lláh’s lifetime where he addresses the specific question as follows:
Question: “Concerning the legitimacy or otherwise of marrying one’s relatives.”
Answer: “These matters likewise rest with the Trustees of the House of Justice.”
The question is direct, and the answer delegates the determination rather than specifying whether marriage to one’s mother, daughter, sister, aunt, or niece is prohibited.
(Bahá’í Reference Library)
This distinction matters. The omission was not simply the result of an issue never being raised. The issue was expressly raised, and Bahá’u’lláh declined to enumerate the prohibited blood relationships in his answer.
3. The extraordinary delay: 1873–2010
1873
Kitáb-i-Aqdas claimed to be revealed; prohibition of father’s wife stated.
1892
Bahá’u’lláh dies; Q&A No. 50 had delegated the question to the House of Justice.
1963
First Universal House of Justice elected — approximately 90 years after the Aqdas.
1981
UHJ confirms that it has not yet made regulations on marriage with kindred.
2010
UHJ letter identifies prohibited close-family relationships, referring to prohibitions already made clear.
The most revealing document is the UHJ letter of 15 January 1981, written in response to a National Spiritual Assembly’s inquiry dated 15 December 1980. Its operative passage states:
“The House of Justice has not as yet seen fit to make regulations on the subject of marriage with one’s kindred.”
It then says:
“For the present, therefore, decisions are left to the consciences of the individual Bahá’ís who must, of course, obey the civil law.”
The letter further requires consideration of prevailing customs and traditions so that conduct does not adversely reflect upon the Faith. The complete reproduced letter is available in Lights of Guidance, item 1289.
(bahai-library.com)
This is a remarkable chronology. Even 18 years after the UHJ’s establishment, it had not enacted the regulations requested. The 2010 letter, issued approximately 137 years after the Aqdas, explicitly identifies prohibited close-family relationships, while claiming that at least some prohibitions had already been made clear.
4. What would a young Bahá’í have understood in 1985?
Consider as an example, a young Bahá’í in 1985 who wanted to know which relatives could be married under his religion.
He could consult the Kitáb-i-Aqdas and find the explicit prohibition concerning his father’s wife. He could consult Questions and Answers No. 50 and discover that the matter had been referred to the House of Justice. He could then consult the 1981 UHJ guidance and learn that the institution had not yet made regulations on marriage with kindred.
He would be directed toward conscience, civil law, local customs, and other applicable Bahá’í guidance.
This could produce a genuine difficulty: How could he determine the precise religious status of a proposed marriage involving a blood relative?
A marriage prohibited by civil law would be impermissible under the UHJ’s direction to obey that law. But civil legislation varies between jurisdictions. A relationship legally prohibited in one country may be legally permitted in another. Social customs also vary.
Consequently, the 1981 approach left more room for differences between jurisdictions than a universal, explicit scriptural catalogue would have done.
This does not establish that an ordinary Bahá’í in 1985 believed sibling marriage was acceptable. Indeed, most would likely have regarded it as unacceptable, based on the society formed by customs based on earlier religions. The problem is narrower and more precise: the foundational Bahá’í texts did not provide an explicit, comprehensive answer to the very question fundamental to operation of the human society they had expressly referred to a future institution and not answering leaves room for corruption.
5. The theological difficulty: Why delegate something so fundamental?
Bahá’í theology offers an explanation for the delegation of legislation. The Kitáb-i-Aqdas is presented not as an exhaustive legal code but as the foundation of a system whose details may be developed over time by the Universal House of Justice.
Its official introduction explains that foundational laws are recorded in scripture while subsidiary laws may be left to the House of Justice.
(Bahá’í Reference Library)
That explanation is understandable for subjects such as new technologies, financial arrangements, or administrative procedures that change with historical circumstances.
But should the prohibition of marriage between parents and children, or brothers and sisters, be classified as subsidiary legislation?
This is the strongest objection to the Bahá’í position.
The issue was neither technologically novel nor historically unforeseen. It had already been addressed in detail by earlier religions. Bahá’u’lláh could have stated the foundational prohibitions and delegated only more distant or exceptional relationships to future legislation.
Instead, his response to a direct question referred the matter as a whole to the House of Justice which did not exist.
Furthermore, the 1981 letter raises a problem of legal certainty. If a divinely authorized institution had existed for 18 years but had still not legislated on marriage with kindred, what was the practical purpose of delegating such a fundamental matter without establishing a deadline or interim universal rule?
A Bahá’í response would be that divine revelation need not repeat every rule from previous dispensations, and that conscience, established moral teachings, and civil law remained operative. That defense prevents the conclusion that Bahá’í believers were necessarily without moral guidance.
Nevertheless, it does not entirely answer why a claimed new divine lawgiver provided less explicit scriptural guidance on close-relative marriage than the religious systems he claimed to succeed.
6. Was the omission intended to accommodate future changes in morality?
A further hypothesis deserves examination: perhaps the absence of fixed scriptural prohibitions was intended to leave room for future societies in which some currently prohibited family relationships might become socially acceptable.
As a logical possibility, the Bahá’í system of delegated legislation permits rules on matters not definitively settled in scripture to be developed over time. Its flexibility is an acknowledged feature.
The increasing social acceptance of LGBT people is also paving way for legislation supporting it in many countries. Would a similar acceptability of incestual relations in the future in any country, be considered as a tick for allowability of related marriages as per Bahai scriptures and guidance?
The stronger argument is not that Bahá’í scripture was deliberately preparing society for incest. It is that its delegation of a foundational moral question leaves the boundaries of prohibited kinship less securely anchored in the founder’s explicit revelation than in the earlier Abrahamic scriptures.
Conclusion
The historical evidence supports a substantial criticism of Bahá’í religious legislation.
The Old Testament and Quran explicitly prohibit numerous close-family relationships. The New Testament condemns incestuous conduct within the inherited biblical framework. Bahá’u’lláh, by contrast, expressly prohibited marriage to one’s father’s wife but did not enumerate prohibited blood relationships—even when asked directly.
The Universal House of Justice was established approximately 90 years after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas. In 1981, it acknowledged that it had not yet made regulations on marriage with kindred, leaving individuals to conscience, civil law, and local customs. The 2010 guidance identifies prohibited close-family relationships, although its wording does not establish that all those prohibitions originated in that year.
The resulting question is difficult to dismiss:
If earlier revelations could identify the most fundamental prohibited family relationships thousands of years ago, why would a later revelation claiming divine authority leave those relationships unspecified and delegate their determination to an institution that would not exist for approximately 90 years?
This historical omission presents a serious challenge to its account of progressive revelation and to the distinction between foundational divine law and matters supposedly appropriate for subsequent human legislation.
Whether the definition of prohibited close-family marriages belongs to the unchanging foundations of religious morality—or whether it can legitimately remain a subject of deferred legislation. This, we leave to the conscience of the esteemed reader.
Principal references
- Leviticus 18:6–18, Old Testament. https://www.bible.com/bible/1/LEV.18.6-18.KJV?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- 1 Corinthians 5:1, New Testament. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+5:1&version=KJV&utm_source=chatgpt.com
- Surah al-Nisa 4:22–24, Quran. https://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=23&utm_source=chatgpt.com
- Kitáb-i-Aqdas, §107, Questions and Answers No. 50, and Note 133, official Bahá’í Reference Library. https://www.bahai.org/library/authoritative-texts/bahaullah/kitab-i-aqdas?utm_source=chatgpt.com
https://bahai.works/Lights_of_Guidance/Laws_of_Marriage?utm_source=chatgpt.com - UHJ letter, 15 January 1981, reproduced in Lights of Guidance, item 1289. https://bahai.works/Lights_of_Guidance/Laws_of_Marriage?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- UHJ letter, 15 January 2010, Messages from the Universal House of Justice, 2001–2022, message 146, “Restrictions on Marrying Relatives.” https://www.bahai.org/library/authoritative-texts/the-universal-house-of-justice/muhj-2001-2022?utm_source=chatgpt.com